

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































1 Out of roughly 1.1 million working farms in the US,  only 10,000, or just over 1 percent, are permitted 
dischargers under the provisions of the CWA (Adler et al., 1993).  These are for the most part large-scale 
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confined animal feeding operations (CAFOs).  Because they store huge quantities of animal manure in 
manure lagoons they are treated as point source emitters, and in most cases they are required to treat, land-
apply, or carry off-site all of their manure; in the language of water quality regulation, they are allowed 



































































































































2 The Kyoto Protocol comes close, but it is not a true global cap – it does not apply to all countries, 
participation by individual counties is at their discretion, and its enforcement mechanisms remain 


















































MI Dept. of Environmental Quality Nov. 2002
USA Environmental Protection Agency Jan. 2003
ID Dept. of Environmental Quality Nov. 2003
CO Dept. of Public Health and Environment Oct. 2004
OR Dept. of Environmental Quality Jan. 2005
VA State Water Control Board Nov. 2006
FL Dept. of Environmental Protection Dec. 2006
PA Dept. of Environmental Protection Dec. 2006
OH Environmental Protection Agency Jan. 2007
MD Dept. of the Environment Apr. 2008
WV Dept. of Environmental Protection May 2008
MN Pollution Control Agency Jul. 2008





































































































3 The only operational GHG offset market in the US that is geographically restricted is the Regional 
Greenhouse Gas Initiative, which caps greenhouse gas emissions for electric power utilities in 10 northeast 

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 3.1:  Water Quality Trading Programs Nationwide (Proposed, Past 
Functioning, and Presently Functioning) 
Figure adapted from Environmental Trading Network 
Adapted from Environmental Trading Network 
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Table 3.1.  Functioning Water Quality Trading Programs in North America
State Trading Program Watershed/Basin
Trading 
Agents
AZ Carlota Copper Pinto Creek PS-NPS
CA
Grassland Area Farmers Tradable 
Loads Program
Lower San Joaquin River 
Watershed PS-PS
CO Bear Creek Bear Creek Watershed PS-PS
CO Chatfield Reservoir Chatfield Reservoir PS-NPS
CO Cherry Creek Cherry Creek Watershed PS-NPS
CO Lake Dillon Reservoir Lake Dillon Reservoir PS-NPS
CT
Connecticut Nitrogen Credit Exchange 
Program Long Island Sound Watershed PS-PS
DE Pinnacle (Vlasic Foods) Delaware Inland Bays PS-NPS






ID Lower Boise Lower Boise River Watershed PS-NPS
IL Piasa Creek Piasa Creek Watershed PS-NPS
MA Charles River Watershed Charles River Watershed PS-PS
MA Wayland Business Center Sudbury River Watershed PS-NPS
MI Kalamazoo River Watershed Kalamazoo River Watershed PS-NPS
MN Minnesota River 
Lower Minnesota River 
Watershed PS-PS
MN Rahr Malting Co
Lower Minnesota River 
Watershed PS-NPS
MN
Southern Minnesota Beet Sugar 
Cooperative
Lower Minnesota River 
Watershed PS-NPS
NC Neuse River Compliance Association Neuse River Basin PS-PS
NC Tar-Pamlico Basin Association Tar-Pamlico River Basin PS-PS
NM Taos Ski Valley Rio Grande River Basin PS-NPS
NY NYC Phosphorous Offset Program Croton Watershed PS-NPS
OH Alpine Cheese Sugar Creek Watershed PS-NPS
OH
Great Miami River Watershed Trading 
Pilot Great Miami River Watershed PS-NPS
ON
South Nation Phosphorus Trading 
Program South Nation River Watershed PS-NPS
OR Clean Water Services Tualatin River Basin PS-NPS
PA Conestoga Watershed Conestoga Watershed PS-NPS
PA Chesapeake Bay Trading Program Chesapeake Bay (in PA) PS-NPS















ID Lower Boise 1997 In development
IL Piasa Creek 2001 Ongoing
MI Kalamazoo River 1996 Ongoing
MN Rahr Malting 1997 All trades have occurred
MN SMBSC 1999 Ongoing
NC Tar-Pamlico 1990 All trades have occurred
OH Alpine Cheese 2005 Ongoing
OH Great Miami 2004 Ongoing
ON South Nation 2000 Ongoing
OR Clean Water Services 2004 Ongoing
PA Conestoga River 2005 All trades have occurred
PA Chesapeake Bay 2008 Ongoing
WI Fox River 2000 Never past development stage
WI Red Cedar 1998 Ongoing
WI Rock River 1997 Never past development stage
Table 3.2.  PS-NPS Programs Involving Farmers
144 
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1 I should note that the idealized pattern of interviewing one coordinator, one intermediary, and one 
regulatory agent was more the exception than the rule.  Every trading program across the country is 
structured a little bit differently, and these different contexts called for different interviewing strategies.  
For example, in the case of multiple programs within the same state (e.g., SMBSC and Rahr Malting, 
both in Minnesota), a single individual at the state’s Pollution Control Agency was the chief government 
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official involved with both programs.  I did not interview him twice (once for each program), but rather 
tried to frame my questions so they could be answered for each program respectively within the same 
interview.  As a second example, the Pennsylvania Chesapeake Bay program does not feature a program 
coordinator per se.  It could be argued that the credit broker (a private-sector brokerage firm) is 
simultaneously the coordinator, in the sense that they helped put the administrative pieces of the program 
into place and then proceeded to go into the field and procure credits from farmers.  In this case, I 
interviewed two regulatory agents and the broker, but no one else who could be called a coordinator.  To 
give a third example, in the case of the Clean Water Services program in Oregon, there is also not an 
independent coordinator – the role is filled by a dedicated staff member at the PS discharger, a regional 
water utility.  I interviewed several individuals who work for this discharger, each of whom is closely 























 Table 3.3:  Number of Interviews by Program and Role Category
State Trading Program Regulator Coordinator Intermediary
Program 
Totals
ID Lower Boise 1 0 0 1
IL Piasa Creek 0 1 2 3
MI Kalamazoo River 0 1 3 4
MN Rahr Malting 1 1 0 2
MN SMBSC 1 1 1 3
NC Tar-Pamlico 0 2 0 2
OH Alpine Cheese 1 1 3 5
OH Great Miami 0 1 9 1
ON South Nation 0 2 1 3
OR Clean Water Services 0 2 1 3
PA Conestoga River 0 1 1 2
PA Chesapeake Bay 2 0 1 3
WI Fox River 0 0 0 0
WI Red Cedar 1 2 1 4
WI Rock River 0 0 0 0
-- Other Individuals N/A N/A N/A 3
























































































































































































Lower Boise ID - N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 0 -
Piasa Creek IL + - + - + - 2 +
Kalamazoo River MI - N/A† - - + - 1 +
Rahr Malting MN + - - - + - 3 +
SMBSC MN + - + - - - 2 +
Tar-Pamlico NC + - - - - - 1 +
Alpine Cheese OH + - - -  +/-* - 2 +
Great Miami OH - N/A† + +    +/- ** - 3 +
South Nation ON + - - - - + 2 +
Clean Water Serv. OR + + - - + - 3 +
Conestoga River PA - N/A† + + + + 4 +
Chesapeake Bay PA + + + +       - *** - 4 +
Fox River WI - N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 0 -
Red Cedar WI - + + - + - 3 +
Rock River WI - N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 0 -
Totals 8 3 6 3 8 2 12
Binom. Correl. 0.53 0.25 0.41 0.25 0.53 0.20
*** In Chesapeake Bay, the trading ratio is actually a "delivery ratio" that changes according to how far a 
given BMP is from a major water body.  Thus it cannot be said with certainty that it is always greater than 
2:1.  However, based on my data it is nearly always the case.
** The Great Miami program features multiple trading ratios, depending on whether the discharger is 
discharging into attaining waters or not, and on whether the relevant BMPs are fully implemented or not.  
Of the four possible permutations, the only trading ratio greater than 2:1 is for those dischargers 
discharging into impaired waters and buying credits based on BMPs that are not fully 
implemented/verified yet.
*  The Alpine Cheese program has several trading ratios:  most BMPs fall between 2:1 and 8:1.  
However, milkhouse waste is considered a direct discharge (i.e., a "point source") and trades involving 
milkhouse waste retention received a trading ratio of 1:1.
†  Since these three programs are not driven by binding effluent restrictions, the question of entering and 


























































Lower Boise ID - N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A - 0 -
Piasa Creek IL + - + - + - + 2 +
Kalamazoo River MI - N/A - - + - + 1 +
Rahr Malting MN + - - - + - - 3 +
SMBSC MN + - + - - - + 2 +
Tar-Pamlico NC + - - - - - + 1 +
Alpine Cheese OH + - - - +/- - + 2 +
Great Miami OH - N/A + + +/- - + 3 +
South Nation ON + - - - - + + 2 +
Clean Water Serv. OR + + - - + - + 3 +
Conestoga River PA - N/A + + + + + 4 +
Chesapeake Bay PA + + + + - - + 4 +
Fox River WI - N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A - 0 -
Red Cedar WI - + + - + - + 3 +
Rock River WI - N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A - 0 -
Totals 8 3 6 3 8 2 11 12


































































































































































I think when the legislature in Wisconsin put some money towards a pilot trading 
project, there was 3 or 4 locations in Wisconsin that were eligible for the pilot.  My 
counterparts around the state, when they were faced with this thing, said basically ‘We 
can do this, if the municipality [PS] pays us to do it. . .  We can do this but there's 
gonna be an administrative fee.'  And that's where it fell apart.  Because the 
municipality that needed to do this looked at the administrative fee and said, 'Boy it's 
not hardly worth it to do this.'  Our approach was that, we're here as a county 
department, an agency of county government, our task in life is soil and water 
conservation.  We've got this thing set up so it takes a minimum of time – it’s not like 
we're spending thousands of staff hours every year.  Why should we charge extra 
money when we're already here, and our objective is to get conservation on the land?  
And I think that's one of the big reasons why it has gone well, because we're not 









[One] of the barriers there was the unwillingness for the county to play the same role 
that Barron County played.  And then also there was some concerns about the way 
that the crediting was going on at the time, with the Cumberland proposal – there was 
an inability to come up with a better number that we felt more comfortable with from 
an agency [perspective]. . . .  But I think one of the big factors was the lack of having 
that partner from the county, 'cause I think if the county had been more accepting, 



































(# BMPs implemented per county )     











Table 4.3:  County Agricultural Statistics for Kalamazoo River Watershed
County # BMPs
















Allegan 18 25-50% 275,120  52.0% 1,595    172 3,303 1.2% 155,554 44,971 
Calhoun 4 50-75% 227,944  45.6% 1,178    194 7,188 3.2% 132,087 14,819 






























Early on in the project, they kind of put [the program] out to all the conservation 
districts, but there wasn't any reason for [taking it on] – I mean, if you came across 
someone who had heard about the project, you may guide them in that direction, get 
them to talk to someone, but there wasn't anyone out here that, that was their job to 
































I would say our [problem] was a budget situation with the lack of personnel.  I don't 
have a 319 person on hand.  I mean, he [the aforementioned agent from Allegan 
County] could spend a certain amount of time working on [trading] projects.  And he's 
been there a long time, he's very knowledgeable, and had the time to do much more 







No, no, I think any of us could have had funding.  It was just that they had a 319 
[project.]  I'm a little envious, I wish I'd have had a [agent’s name] in my office, 
instead of using existing programs to do the outreach, or someone comes to the 
counter and you tell 'em about it.  We could have sent them out in the field with NRCS 
or had them do an 'inventory and evaluation,' more than looking at a map and 
knowing producers' names. . . .  I think the one-on-one [would have been more 
effective], rather than a brochure or an article in the paper about it. . . .   
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We approached producers who came in, but I didn't make a lot of follow-up calls or do 
a survey myself driving around the [watershed].  So for us, I would say, not having 












































































(# BMPs implemented per county )     



































Auglaize 0 <25% 213,296 83.1% 1,059 201 8,797   4.1% 148,127 20,055 
Butler 1 >75% 127,194 42.5% 949    134 1,195   0.9% 72,203   15,771 
Champaign 0 >75% 204,901 74.7% 931    220 5,080   2.5% 154,450 8,051   
Clark 2 50-75% 177,335 69.3% 744    238 1,522   0.9% 137,247 19,800 
Darke 21 >75% 350,450 91.3% 1,772 198 5,348   1.5% 274,960 36,595 
Greene 0 <25% 162,533 61.2% 776    209 1,263   0.8% 124,808 3,092   
Hamilton 0 25-50% 21,290 8.2% 291    73 73        0.3% 6,144     831      
Hardin 0 <25% 256,822 85.3% 847    303 11,535 4.5% 196,129 15,185 
Logan 1 50-75% 201,306 68.6% 956    211 12,266 6.1% 135,393 7,432   
Mercer 1 <25% 293,026 98.8% 1,302 225 4,712   1.6% 217,147 79,058 
Miami 5 100% 196,943 75.6% 1,048 188 1,460   0.7% 158,580 11,685 
Montgomery 2 >75% 111,000 37.6% 804    138 691      0.6% 84,480   8,707   
Preble 8 >75% 230,616 84.8% 1,181 195 3,442   1.5% 182,134 16,133 
Shelby 8 >75% 217,969 83.2% 1,050 208 6,683   3.1% 158,395 27,498 
Warren 1 <25% 94,348 36.9% 896    105 634      0.7% 55,614   2,631   
Zero-order 
correlation with # 
BMPs



















We just haven't been able to generate that much interest. 
▪ 
I guess our experience with the program here wasn’t as good as maybe some of the 
others. 
▪ 
Interviewer:  Have you had any difficulty getting farmers interested in it?       




Interviewer:  Would you say from your perspective and the perspective of [your 
agency], at least in terms of landowner participation, that it's working? 
 
Agent:  Well it's -- [long pause] -- yes to some degree.  I don't want to oversimplify it.  




Interviewer:  Do you anticipate much action on the future round [of funding]? 








































We did not advertise.  They [the Conservancy District] sent out flyers, we did not put an 
ad in our newsletter. (0 BMPs) 
▪ 
There's some newspaper articles on it usually. . . .  And if they come in looking for funds 
to rectify a problem.  (1 BMP) 
▪ 
Interviewer:  Did you do a lot of word-of-mouth advertising when you were out on farms, 
just talking to folks?   Agent:  [Pause].  No, I can't say that we did.  (5 BMPs) 
▪ 
Interviewer:  How did you get word out to the farmers?  What were the main channels?  
Agent:  Well, the Conservancy District gave us promotional materials, and we put it in our 
newsletter, and uh – that's what we did.  And probably a press release. . . .  We only got a 





My philosophy on things too is – I don't know if you've talked to ___ County, but one 
year they had 70 applications.  And we only had, like, four.  And how I look at it is, I 
get the word out and it's a voluntary program, and if you wanna volunteer – hey, I'm 
here and I'll help you out.  I think a lotta counties go out there and push it and push it 
and, you know, 'We'll help you, we'll help you.'  I do everything on a volunteer basis –  
if you wanna do it, great, I'm here, but I'm not gonna come to your door every week 









One I'm working with right now, a year ago when they announced the signup, I told 
another [agent], 'Let's go up and see this guy.'  He goes, 'What are you gonna tell 
him?'  I says, 'I don't know what I'm gonna tell him, we'll just get up there and see 
how things ring out once we get in the door.'  And he kinda opened up the door, [he 
said] 'Come on in here,' and I told him what was all up and everything, [by the time] 




























































































































































I think we did a five-county area with radio broadcasts on farm radio to bring folks in 
the door, and we did a mailing through five counties to 4,000 different producers. . .  
You know, we send newsletters out – they go to actors on different subjects all the 
time and we never get a really great response. . . .  These producers actually got 
three mailings to their homes, they had an initial big postcard, a week later another 
one came saying ‘Hey, last week you received this,’ and then we sent another 
one.  You know, we thought we’d just be slammed. . . . and I was absolutely amazed, 
I think out of all that advertising dollars, I think we had about five folks come to talk 
about water quality trading. . . .   The producers that walk in the door and get into 
these programs will jump on all of ‘em, but getting them in the door and getting that 














And the Conservation District technicians, as part of their regular rounds in interacting 
with farmers, they were pitching and pushing our auction among their other 
conservation programs.  It was really working through the Conservation District and 
their professional staff in implementing the auction. . .  They’re the main conveyor of 
federal and state conservation grant money, and then this program really had to be 
woven into that same delivery system, so the Conservation District, I can’t emphasize 
enough, their expertise, and as importantly or more importantly, the trust and 
familiarity they have with the ag community was essential for the success we had.  I 








































A lot of it was just farmers that we already had working relationships with, that we 
knew were looking for some kind of cost-share . . .  there’s always a list of names of 
people that come to mind. . . so that’s kinda how a lot of people got pulled into that 
program, they were already operators that the Conservation District or NRCS folks had 
been working with, and through our relationship we knew they were trying to do some 
practices and trying to figure out which practices tied into that particular program, and 
then, you know, going out and just kinda presenting it to those operators.  If it’s 
somebody we haven’t talked to in a little while it might just be a phone call to say 
‘Hey, just lettin’ you know this program’s comin’ across, this is what it’s offering,’ 





As far as this program being successful and projects getting recruited – definitely it’s 
the relationships with the farmers, because a lot of the projects that went through – 
and I can speak from my experience – were the farmers that I worked with the most 
frequently, that I had regular contact with and knew they were looking to do 
something, so when it came down to it, even though they weren’t really sure about 
the program or weren’t totally 100% knowing how it worked, you know, they were 









The ones that we’ve had [in the trading program] have kind of been – I hate to use 
the term hand-picked, but a lot of the ones that we’ve had, that I’ve been successful 
in getting in have been projects that, had it not been for a set of criteria in CRP or 
EQIP, we probably would have used EQIP or CRP for the first choice.  But the Farm Bill 
programs a lot of times have some goofy stipulations with ‘em or some criteria that 
not all farms meet . . . and that set of criteria doesn’t exist in the water quality credit 
trading program.  So what we do here in this office is basically maintain a list of good 
projects that we can’t get to go through EQIP or CRP, and when they open up the 
signup on water quality trading we’ll mention to these folks when we’re talking to ‘em, 
‘Hey, I’ve got another program, would you be interested in this?’  And that’s how we 





















We worked pretty hard at identifying key leaders, or at least key people in three or 
four different communities.  And [he] went and talked with them, and then we 
prepared little flyers for them to pass out, that there was going to be an information 
meeting in their neighborhood at this particular house.  Most of the people that 





Probably the biggest key to building success is to go out and find projects with some 
of your key farmers – may be some of your biggest farmers, it may just be a key 
farmer that’s on your local Farm Bureau or something like that – and work with 
them.  There’s key ones that we know to go to, and they will be out and about really 
being your word of mouth – they’ll spread the word and they’ll either give you a list of 
their neighbors that they need you to talk to, or they’ll talk to their neighbors and tell 

























I think farmers sort of have a wait-and-see attitude.  If other farmers start doing it 
and having success then other farmers are more and more likely to adopt that same 
practice, whatever it is – whether it be no-till or streambank fencing or doing CREP 
tree plantings.  So the cultural issue cannot be understated. . . .  Until the farmers 
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really understand and trust whatever it is you’re proposing, you’re not gonna get a lot 
of buy-in.  And then until some of them actually do it and demonstrate some success 
































It’s that old change-management thing, especially when you’re dealing with farmers, 
right?  They never want to be part of a pilot, they never want to be part of something 
new.  And so you just try to give ‘em what they’ve always had, and up here we’ve 
always had some type of grant program for farmers.  So we well this as a BMP 
program, and . . .  they are aware that they’re part of a trading program, [but] we 
never go out there and say ‘Hi we’re part of a trading program.’  We say ‘Hi, we’ve got 


















I’ve tried to explain to them at some of the meetings and then on an individual basis 
that you have something out here that a cheese plant or a wastewater treatment plant 
needs, and they’re willing to pay for that.  So you can, you know, you can compare 
that to selling corn or selling something else.  And I think that helped them get over 










































We do a lot of the same functions as a consultant.  The farmers will call us out and ask 
what they should do about a particular problem – if they see a problem with their 
beets they wanna know if it’s insects or weeds or what’s going on.  And we’re trained 
to do that.  And the other part is because we’re not paid by a fertilizer [company] or 














Probably a lot, lot less of [the projects] would be done, and those that would be done 
would be done very poorly.  ‘Cause I don’t think there are too many people – 
contractors, landowners – that are capable of properly designing a lot of the things we 
do so it’ll last.  They would throw up a lot of half-assed things.  I can see that 











































As far as the conservation side, we’ve had a lot of people come just to deal with a 
personal problem.  Say they’ve got a gully, they’ve got erosion in their fields.  You 
have the big storm event. . .  And so those events create problems that maybe have 
only happened once, or maybe never on a farm, and they’re usually on a grand scale, 
and so this would be the first place that they’d come. . . .  When it comes to the 
bigger problems, a lot of farmers are gonna come here not only to look for what to do 
and how to do it – because we base everything on USDA NRCS standards and 
specifications, so . . . you’re pretty assured that if you follow that you’re not gonna 
have those problems down the road.  And we can provide them with that engineering 
assistance, we can provide them with that technical assistance, and many times even 
program dollars – cost share assistance to help correct that problem.  How big it needs 
to be, how wide it needs to be, what grasses you need to plant for their type of soils – 












































Conservation Agent:  I mean he was 20 years in Extension.  So he started roughly 20 
years ago with Extension, he saw the need to do some outreach with the Amish.  And 
he started pasture walks, he’d go out in the community and hold meetings.  He had an 
Amish advisory committee to help give feedback.  So he kind of got that ball rolling. . . 
. I know that he made a very concerted effort to get those programs out into the 
Amish, so that helped us build our relationships. 
Interviewer: Can you guess what the Alpine program would have been like if [he] 
hadn’t been around? 
Coordinator:  I think we could have done all right on our own, but his involvement 
made it a lot easier.  I think it sped it up tremendously. 
Conservation Agent:  It’s a little doubtful that we’d be at the stage we’re at now.  We’d 
have got it done eventually, but . . . without [him], it would have taken 2-3 years to 
generate as much interest from farmers as we got in just the first year. 
Coordinator:  He instantly brought credibility to the project.  It would have taken us 
several years to build up the credibility he had. . . .  So that’s key, who you have out 








It’s a matter of credibility, and each of our guys is trying to establish credibility with 
our growers by giving them sound advice all along. . . .  They trust us because they 
know we’re not on somebody else’s agenda – our goal is to get every nickel back to 
the grower that we can, because if the growers are strong, the co-op is strong, and 


















We are not an enforcement agency.  From the Chesapeake Bay Foundation’s point of 
view, and from Penn Future, another large environmental organization, we’re kinda 
seen as a watchdog to make sure that these farms are doing the right thing.  From the 
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farmer’s point of view, we’re the ones that are putting these plans in place and helping 
them if something bad actually happens. . . .  [The] farmer . . . doesn’t have an 
advocate if something really goes bad.  And quite often we’ve been the ones that have 
helped them design the manure storage, or we’ve done the design on the waterway or 
something like that on the environmental part of their farm, but we’ve also been the 


















People don’t trust people that’s not from a farming background.  Farmers feel relaxed 
with people that they know locally, that they know is not coming from the city.  You 
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know, when you show up and you know what they’re talking about, you know what 
corn and soybeans are, you know what a corn planter is, you know the dimensions, 
you know the tillage, you know the soil loss, you know fertilizers, you know everything 
they’re doing.  Because we’re farmers too, basically.  The people in our office, we’re 






Part of what we learned in trying to set up the program was farmers didn’t really want 
to talk to city folks.  They didn’t want to be regulated.  And so we thought, rather than 
having one of our employees being in there trying to negotiate with them, why don’t 
we use the Soil & Water Conservation District as our agent. . . .  That way, you know, 
they knew the farmers, they had that relationship. . . .  It wasn’t us, kinda the wide-
eyed city environmentalists going out and telling a farmer how to plant something, it 
wasn’t gonna work.  The guy who did this work originally was a guy named ____  – 
you talk about your yuppie from downtown Portland, that was him.  He would have 
never fit in with the farmers.  He came with the money, they were happy that he had 













You send out a couple of aggies who just got out of school and the farmer’s saying ‘Oh 
crap, who are these kids coming up my driveway?’  Whereas our farmer field reps, you 
know, we cherry pick ‘em, we ask around in the community . . .  We cherry pick these 
guys and ladies, so when they seem ‘em coming up the farm lane, then they know 
that they’re getting somebody who knows what’s going on in the real world.  And that 












You know, I can go out and lay out five basins, five terraces, or five dry dams and 
make it very farmer-friendly, where they can farm it but not take land out of 
production.  You get somebody that’s not from a farming background, they’re probably 
gonna build stuff that’s not farmer-friendly.  It’ll work, but they’ll probably over-build, 
and it’ll probably be a lot more expensive to install, compared to something that NRCS 





Most public engineers don’t know anything about how to put farm-friendly stuff on 
farmers’ ground.  You know, they don’t teach you that in engineering school.  I mean, 
they know how to build everything but usually they don’t have the standard specs like 
NRCS does – we’ve been doing this for 75 years, so we’ve got proven records on how 





















When you talk to a bureaucrat, I don’t care you are, you don’t tell ‘em everything.  
The interesting thing that a lot of our field reps are telling me is that they’re almost 
like the local psychologist.  You know, farmers, they don’t like to go out and say, ‘Well 
I’m stupid here.’  They don’t like to go out and say ‘Well I really screwed up’ – you 
know – ‘Geez, I got 10 dead cows here behind my barn, if anybody finds out about 
that I’m screwed.’  You know, they’re no different than you and me.  So what the 
farmer field reps are telling me is that they’ll go out there and the farmers will show 
them stuff that they will never, ever show anybody else, including another 
farmer.  They will talk to them about the problems they’ve got, and the farm 
communities that are under stress.  They’re able to vent, and because of the stature 
that these guys have in the community, because people know who they are – these 
guys have been farming and they know their way around the bureaucracy, so they’re 
able to sort of be a little bit of a counselor to some of these guys. . . .  They’re talking 
to a peer, and they’re able to say ‘Yeah, you’re right, I should fix this up.’  Whereas if 
you’re talking to an aggie, some of the younger people, now you’re not going to tell 








You know, the average Joe lives in a house and has their yard and do whatever they 
do, but the farmer is kind of looked at as, you know, they own all that land out there 
and many times somebody just sees a farmer out there spreading manure or spraying 
the fields with whatever – everyone assumes that it’s bad, they assume that it’s gonna 




























doesn’t necessarily want to see the return [on his investment in a conservation 
practice] so much as no loss.  Everybody’s willing to participate if there’s no 
damage.  What causes problems, at least in my experience in working on these 
projects, is, ok we’ll put in a pattern tile and, what if I lose 10 bushels an acre, or 
what if I lose part of my crop in that area?  It’s not so much ‘What does it cost 
me?  What’s my return on investment?  How quickly can I pay this off?’  It’s ‘do no 
harm.’  I don’t wanna lose bushels or pounds per acre because I’m participating in 
something that’s different.  That’s what you have to overcome to get people to commit 
to do these types of projects. . . .  Farmers like to see numbers, they like to see who’s 
done it.  Am I the cutting edge – I don’t wanna be the cutting edge.  I know that if I 
plant exactly the same way my grandpa planted, if I run this farm exactly the same 
way daddy ran the farm, I know exactly what I’m gonna get.  And as long as you don’t 





















When you’re working from the EPA or the Department of Environmental Quality at the 
state level, when you’re working at that [level of] ‘Hey if we find it, you’re going to 
start the $10,000 a day fines,’ I mean, who’s going to work with you?  Who’s even 














‘We were concerned that you were going to tell us how to run our farms.’  They were 
concerned that there would be so many strings attached that we were gonna tell them 
how to run their farm.  That seems to be where the reservation was.  And they did not 
dream that up – they’ve had other experiences where that was the case.  And so they 









When it comes to working with agriculture, we’re not a regulatory agency.  If you work 
with us it’s completely voluntarily – no one says you gotta work with us.  So we go out 
when people ask us to come out.  We don’t go knockin’ on doors or anything like that, 
telling ‘em that we’re coming and you gotta do this. . . .  When we go out to a site 
we’re there because they’ve requested us to be there, and we usually have in our bag 














































































































Piasa Creek IL - - - - - - 0
Kalamazoo River MI - - - - + - 1
Rahr Malting MN - - + - - - 1
SMBSC MN - - + - - - 1
Tar-Pamlico NC - - - + / - * - - 0.5
Alpine Cheese OH - - - - - - 0
Great Miami OH + + - + - + 4
South Nation ON - - - - - - 0
Clean Water 
Services OR - - - - - - 0
Conestoga River PA + + - - + - 3
Chesapeake Bay PA + - + + - - 3
Red Cedar WI - - - - - - 0
* In the Clean Water Services program, several positions are directly funded by the credit buyer, which is not 
considered market-based; however, there is now an additional financial incentive whereby the intermediary 




































































Some of them guys will put in their bids –  like one guy, he put in a bid at $1.29.  And 
on his $1.29, if he would have put in at another dime [i.e., raised his bid to $1.39 per 
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lb.] it would have come out to be another $10,000.  I said, ‘You gotta be careful.  Is it 
going to be worth trying for ten extra thousand and not get it, somebody underbids 
you, compared to losing ten thousand there, or to put your bid in higher and lose your 















This is the big [company] secret.  We do this [contract], and we hold these 
certifications. . . .  So we’ve got two contracts, one with the farm and one with [the 
buyer].  The trigger with the farm is when we sell the credits we implement that BMP 
on the farm.  But [our company] retains the rights to those credits. . . .  It really is a 
futures market.  So what we’ve done is we’ve set it up so that we’ve got all of these 
contracts in place that we can flood the market and say ‘We’re ready to go.’   
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[We] can alter the grant rate or the grant maximums to change the market conditions.  
So right now, for instance, manure storage:  we’ll offer a 50% grant up to a maximum 
of $10,000.  Well, a manure storage is gonna cost you 30,000 by the time you’re done 
-- well the guy gets ten, he’s pretty happy to get that.  And our Clean Water 
Committee says, ‘That’s enough – ten thousand, that’s enough.’  . . .  But if we got to 
a point where we were running out of phosphorus credits and we needed to alter the 
market, they could increase either the grant maximum or the percentage . . . so that 
might entice a few more people to get into the game.  So we think we could 



































































[You] don’t wanna turn away a farmer ‘cause he gets mad, he’ll never come back, he’ll 
tell all other farmers and they’ll get mad, you know – so we try and bring everybody 
in, give ‘em a little.  There is a limit on how much each farmer can have [in the 
program].  So we try to spread it around, just so we get more interest – that’s critical.  
I mean, you could do one farmer, enroll his whole farm, let’s say, and shut off the 
































































































My 750,000 pounds of nitrogen only represent 26 farms.  They’re the biggest, 
regulated farms in the state.  And it’s because they’re producing the most manure, I’m 
getting the biggest bang for the buck, because I don’t wanna have to sign 50 different 
contracts to get 24,000 pounds of nitrogen.  I wanna sign one contract with a farmer 










































































Those farmers figured out the reverse auction.  Those farmers ended up making about 
$50,000, plus the implementation of the projects on the ground. . . .  They gamed the 
system. . . .  What those farmers did is, ‘Okay, if I’m gonna get money from the 
reverse auction, I am gonna jack up what the construction costs are gonna be.’  PEC 
[the program administrators] had no idea what the construction costs were.  So the 
farmers jacked up the construction costs, came in with this number, and then when 
we were designing these projects we’re like, ‘These projects are coming in $75,000 
under budget.’  And the farmers are like, ‘Yep.’  But they got the money, ‘cause they 
did it on the reverse auction – the lowest cost.  There was no checks and balances in 
it.  There was no competition, basically.  It was five guys, they all got together and 
said ‘We’re gonna do the same BMPs, we’re gonna put in poultry stacking structures, 
and we’re gonna dictate what the price is’. . . . These five guys basically got into the  
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know and were the only ones doing the reverse auction.  It sucked up all the money 






















The farmer field reps, we’ve got ‘em scattered throughout, and these guys, you know, 
they live in the community, they go to the local dance halls, the local bars – if 
somebody’s trying to screw the system, that’s tough to keep that a secret out there. . 
. .  A lot of it’s based on trust and our knowledge of the farmer field reps and their 
knowledge of the area they’re out there working with, so it’s not an issue we have to 
























We have some SWCDs that actually fund a portion of their involvement in the program 
through their bids, and others that don’t because they wanna be as competitive in the 
process as they can be. . . .  They may want to make sure that [a BMP] makes a 
certain price point cut, so they don’t add any [of their own personnel] costs.  Others 
might come in super-aggressive on the producer side and have some leeway.  If 
anyone studies what gets funded and what doesn’t – they might have a shot if they 
come in at 2 bucks, but they’re gonna have a better shot if they come in at a buck-







Agent:  Now if you get some that you see it’s really gonna skew ‘em, you just gotta 
flat out back down. 
Interviewer:  You mean you’re gonna pull off your own hourly [rate], or you’re gonna 
tell [the farmers] that they need to come down on their [bid]? 
Agent:  No, we can back down on our hourly, we take a hit – like we got some that’ll 
put no-till in, they’re not real intensive, where you might only put in $200 for your 























































































































































You get someone to adopt the practice, and then you move on and get somebody else 
to adopt, so you’re hopefully building up that cumulative effect, which could offset any 
of your uncertainties in how well you’re really quantifying your actual savings on each 










We now have relationships with these farmers, and when [the point source’s] permit’s 
up in 5 years, we’re not just gonna ever not talk to ‘em again. . .  You’re gonna get 
more benefits, and hopefully they will continue to add conservation practices as they 
can, or if they have questions they now feel comfortable asking, they’re keeping their 









































I don’t know how much they like it, on lines of the guessing game.  Because it’s just 
like playing a hand of cards, it’s just like playing poker – ok, who’s gonna be doin’ 
what?  But, they’re getting smart . . .  I lay out a chart for them and I say, Here’s 
what you can get at $1.00, $1.10, 20, 30, 40, 50, up to $2. . . .  Well like one said, 
‘Man, I gotta be smart about this.  I wanna go $1.29, he says, I wanna – just in case 
someone goes at $1,30, he says I wanna beat him by a penny, I wanna get in.  So 
some of these guys are thinkin’ when they do these things.  So the guys that don’t 
think a lot about it, they’re just throwing in, like, $1.50, $1,60 – but the guys that 
really think about it seriously – they’re really thinking, ‘Ok what’s gonna put me over 









Our project application form basically says, ‘Bring us your project idea, do it by the 
book,’ and then – the one thing that you have to be careful about here – we don’t buy 
projects.  We pay farmers to generate credits, and basically the SWCDs are the ones 
that say ‘Yep, this farmer can generate this many credits using this practice, and this 
farmer is willing to generate these credits for this much money.’  That’s about it.  So 
at that point, other than the fact that the applicant, which is the SWCD, says, ‘Yeah, 
all the i’s are dotted and all the t’s are crossed and this is consistent with standard 
practices’ – you know, we just leave it up to them.  We’re not gonna become experts 
















It could be that these markets are just gonna go away within a matter of months. . .  I 
can assure you that if the USEPA moves on non-CAFO farms that these markets are 
just gonna go away.  ‘Cause [farmers will] have to do this stuff, there’s nothing they 
can do voluntarily that can be used on a credit market, they have to do it to comply, 
and at that point it’s just – the wastewater plants are gonna have to do what they 
have to, and farmers are gonna have to do what they have to do, and whether any of 
it is efficient will be left for somebody else to study 10 years from now and say ‘Wow, 







































Right now we have a new . . . carbon trading market, where producers that are 
already doing no-till or minimum-till tillage practices in their fields can get paid for 
their carbon sequestering.  So they don’t even have to do anything additional to get 
these carbon credits – you know, we thought farmers would be flying into the office 
and signing up to the program – you know, it’s free money – and it’s amazing, . . .  
we’re one of the largest agricultural counties in the state and we probably have no 
more than 3,000 acres in the program right now.  And you’d think every farmer that 
























It’s very much a trust issue.  If somebody new had come in and tried to go sell it to 
‘em it may not have happened. (Conservation agent, Conestoga program)   
▪ 
If we did not have the belief, the trust, our farmers would never have gone into any 




Well I just don’t think they’d have much success, I don’t think that the farmers have 


































If you look at some of the theory – change management theory, and communication 
theory, and public participation theory – they all say the same thing:  You gotta put 
people in charge of their own destiny.   So we’ve got farmer field reps dealing with 
farmers.  That’s part of public participation [theory].  Change management – well 
people have to, like alcoholics anonymous, they’ve gotta be informed all the way, 
they’ve gotta feel as though they’re part of the decision-making and not just thrust 
upon them.  And communication theory – how do you communicate?  Well, you’ve 
gotta speak the same language.  You know, words have meanings and phrases have 
meanings, and bureaucratic language has – one word has one meaning, and a farmer 
uses that same word in a different way.  If you’re talking two different languages, then 
you’re not gonna have any communication. . . .  you’ve lost it, you’re nowhere near 
any success.  So the economics is there, but the economics gets thrown out the 
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Date  Name  Affiliation  Position 
       
 
 
1. PROGRAM BACKGROUND & BASIC STRUCTURE 
1.1. When was the program started:   
1.2. Pollutant(s) of focus:   
1.3. Size of trading area (watershed):   
1.4. Market structure:  (Exchange; Clearinghouse; Bilateral; Third‐party broker
  ; Offsets  ):  
 
1.5. Major economic driver (TMDL; grant; voluntary):   
1.6. Major participants (names):   
1.6.1. PS buyers:   
1.6.2. PS sellers:   
1.6.3. NPS sellers:   
1.6.4. Others:   
1.7. Number of buyers (currently):   
1.7.1. More buyers joining program in foreseeable future?   
1.7.2. Pounds of pollutant buyer(s) need(s) to fulfill permit(s):   
1.8. Number of sellers:   
1.8.1. More sellers coming online in foreseeable future? 
291 
  
1.9. Trading ratio:   
1.10. Who has legal liability for ensuring credits are actually produced:   
1.11. What technical specifications are used to design/implement/verify BMPs:   
1.11.1. Is this stipulated in the rules or is it informal protocol:   
1.12. [If applicable]: Why, in your estimation, has the program failed to result in 
any trades to date:  
 
 
2. ECONOMIC VARIABLES 
2.1. How is the price of a pound of pollutant determined (e.g., market 
fluctuation; bidding by buyers; reverse auction by sellers; pre‐set price; 
etc.):  
 
2.2. How is the value of the conservation agents’ time factored into the price of 
credits:  
 
2.3. If such a thing can be estimated or averaged, what is the going rate for one 
credit:  
 
2.3.1. What is the range of price fluctuation since the start of the program:   
2.3.2. Total payout by buyer(s) since start of program:   
2.4. If the buyer were to install a technological solution instead of entering into 
the trading program, what is the estimated cost per lb. he would face:  
 
2.5. How many trades have taken place since the start of the program:   
2.6. How are the funded BMPs ultimately chosen, assuming the program has 
the choice to fund several?  E.g., First‐come‐first‐served, or a technical 
advisory board, or a lowest‐cost formula, etc.:  
 
2.6.1. By what process was the initial list of possible BMPs chosen:   
2.7. Can you describe to me the way that payments to farmers work?  (How 
much paid up front versus divided into increments over time):  
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 2.8. How does the trading program’s subsidy compare to the subsidy offered 
by other cost‐share programs:  
 
2.9. What verification or monitoring is required for the annual payments:   
2.10. Are payments to farmers capped at a certain maximum amount:   
2.11. If a given BMP is already being funded by a 319 grant or CREP or EQIP, 
etc., can it also be subsidized by the nutrient trading program:  
 
2.12. Do buyers have their choice of remediation strategies (i.e., can they choose 
to buy credits as one possible option of several):  
 
2.13. What percentage of the total funds in the program go towards water 
quality monitoring:  
 
 
3. ENVIRONMENTAL VARIABLES 
3.1. Remediation goal (lbs. of pollutant):   
3.2. Pounds actually remediated to date:   
3.3. Number of BMPs implemented:   
 
4. SOCIAL VARIABLES 
4.1. The literature on nutrient trading is split into two camps:  
institutional/economic versus social variables [briefly elaborate].  Do you 
fall somewhere between these two camps?  
 
4.2. Is there a chief third‐party intermediary, such as a broker or non‐profit 
agency:  
 
4.3. Years intermediary has been operating in community:   
4.4. How are relations between [the intermediary] and the farming 
community?  Do they have close relations with farmers? 
 
4.5. How would you classify the level of trust between the farming community 
and [the intermediary]? 
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 4.6. Do farmers generally think that [the intermediary] is looking out for their 
best interests:   
 
4.7. Would you say there is a good “fit” between the farming community and 
the type of agriculture, and the program itself (i.e., buyer) [elaborate on 
Alpine example]:  
 
4.8. How do farmers hear about the trading program:   
4.9. Has it been difficult to recruit farmers:    
4.9.1. Are there currently farmers waiting to join the program:   
4.10. Is there a typical type of farmer or landowner that is participating in the 
program:  
 
4.11. Do farmers receive one‐on‐one technical assistance while implementing or 
installing their BMPs?  How much, and from whom:  
 
4.12. Lastly, a philosophical question.  Do you think of trading as a means to 
installing more BMPs, or do you see BMPs as the means to establishing 
trading:  
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